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This study examined cognitive aspects of coping with stress, how these 
related to religiosity, and how they related to outcomes (positive mood, 
and distress). Participants (n=126) were of Protestant or Jewish 
background, and had all experienced recent major stress. They were 
assessed on measures of religiosity, religious coping, perception of the 
consequences of the stressful event, attributions for its occurrence, and 
distress, intrusive unpleasant thoughts and positive affect. Religiosity 
affected ways of thinking about the stressful situation, namely: belief 
that G-d is enabling the individual to bear their troubles 
(religious/spiritual support), belief that it was all for the best, and 
(more weakly) belief that all is ultimately controlled by G-d. Religiosity 
affected neither the proportion of positive consequences perceived as 
outcomes of the event, nor the causal attributions examined. Religious 
background (Protestant versus Jewish) had negligible effects on the 
cognitions measures. Causal pathway analysis suggested that religion-
related cognitions might directly affect positive affect, but not 
distress. Problems of design and interpretation are discussed. The study 
suggests some cognitively mediated means by which religion may have 
comforting effects. 




 Comfort and Joy? Religion, cognition and mood in Protestants 
and Jews under stress 
 
 In recent decades, some agreement has been reached that there is a 
positive association between religion and mental health. This effect 
depends of course upon how both religion and mental health are defined, 
and the overall effect masks a number of specific effects that are 
negative as well as positive. However the overall effect is moderately 
robust (Bergin, 1991; Myers & Diener, 1995; Worthington, Kurusu, 
McCullough & Sandage, 1996).  
 Also in recent decades there has been a rapid growth of interest in 
the cognitive processes involved in reactions to stress, in distress, in 
psychological disorders and in therapy (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). In this study we adapted features of 
recent work on the cognitive aspects of emotion, in order to investigate 
some of the cognitive pathways that could account for aspects of any 
relationship between religion and mental health in individuals under 
stress. 
 Although it has been suggested that religiously-based cognitions may 
have important effects upon outcome in terms of wellbeing, health and 
lower distress (Pargament, Kennell, Hathaway, Grevengoed, Newman & Jones, 
1988; Levin, 1994; McIntosh, 1995), systematic studies of specific 
religious cognitions in relation to outcomes are still in the very early 
stages of development and incorporation into the analysis of religion and 




 Several studies suggest that religion affects causal analysis, 
description and interpretation of events. There is evidence of a theodicy 
effect, that religiosity involves or affects the perception of divine 
control over all or some events. Staples & Mauss (1987) examined the 
discourse of autobiographical accounts of committed (Protestant) 
Christians and found evidence of a "master attributional scheme", whereby 
all events in life are seen as fitting into an overall divine plan. 
Furnham & Brown (1992), Klonoff & Landrine (1994) and Loewenthal & 
Cornwall (1993) found that causal analyses of hypothetical distressing 
events including illnesses were affected by religiosity (including 
denomination) and by the nature of the event. In Loewenthal & Cornwall for 
instance, G-d was seen to be causal in the case of life-threatening 
illnesses and accidents, but not other events (relationship difficulties 
and financial problems). A widely reported corollary of religious belief 
and affiliation is the perception of purpose and meaning both in life and 
in specific events (Paloutzian, 1981;  Staples & Mauss, 1987). Finally, 
there are several reports about religious support, namely the perception 
that G-d is enabling the sufferer to bear trouble and to cope. Loewenthal 
(1992) noted that Jewish participants reported that such support was 
sought and perceived to be helpful, and unpublished data from a study by 
Prudo, Harris & Brown (1984) suggested a similar effect for Protestant 
women. Maton (1989) quantified the extent of perceived spiritual 
(religious) support and showed that it had a stress-buffering effect under 
some conditions, among the Protestants studied.  
5        Comfort and Joy 
 
  
 Work on the emotions and the emotional disorders has indicated links 
between these disorders and causal analysis, description and 
interpretation of events (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Williams & Hargreaves, 
1994). One striking claim is that depression may be linked to an 
attributional style, persistently ascribing events (especially failure) to 
internal, stable and global factors. Some work has suggested the 
possibility of such attributional bias in depression (Gotlib & Hammen, 
1992; Williams & Hargreaves, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 
1988), and in a related vein, Janoff-Bulman (1979) has implicated 
characterological self-blame as a feature of depression.  
 Another claim is that distressed mood can affect differentially the 
retrieval of positively and negatively toned memories and ideas, 
particularly in the direction that depressed people are less able to 
generate positively toned thoughts and memories. This leads to a gloomy 
view of personal history, and a pessimistic view of ones personal future . 
This in turn may have a deleterious effect on mood, by propelling the 
sufferer into a spiral of brooding and further dejection (MacLeod & Byrne, 
1996; MacLeod, Rose & Williams, 1993).  
 To risk over-simplification for the sake of making a clear contrast, 
we might summarise these two traditions of investigation as follows. The 
religious individual sees G-d as an ultimate cause, and even if things are 
bad there is a concealed ultimate good, and sees grounds for basic 
optimism. The depressed individual blames the self, especially if things 
are bad, and sees nothing to hope for. These two lines of causal analysis 
lead on the one hand to trust, and on the other to self-blame and despair. 
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In this simplified outline, then, it is possible to suggest that religious 
ideas might lead to better mental health outcomes, especially in adverse 
circumstances.  
 This outline is consistent with some of the existing evidence, but it 
is quite speculative. It forms a background for this present attempt to 
assess specific cognitions among people who had recently undergone severe 
stress, to examine whether these cognitions were related to religiosity 
and to religious background, and to examine their relations to mental 
health outcomes. We followed the general position of Lazarus & Folkman 
(1984) and Pennebaker (1985), who suggest that cognitive reappraisal is 
important in combating morbid rumination, and suggest that religion may 
provide a repertoire of ideas helpful in such cognitive reappraisal. In 
this study we were not focusing on religious ideas which might be 
associated with poor outcomes, such as “G-d is punishing me”, or “G-d is 
not listening to my prayers” (Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993; Pargament 
& Brant, 1998; Wallston, Malcarne, Flores, Hansdottir, Smith, Stein, 
Weisman & Clements, in press).  
 We examined three sets of beliefs – religious coping cognitions - 
that have previously been linked with religion: first, that everything is 
for the best (Paloutzian, 1981; Staples & Mauss, 1987); second, that G-d 
is in control; third, that G-d is supporting the individual enabling one 
to bear pain and suffering (Maton, 1989). We examined three aspects of 
cognition that have previously been linked to depression: first, the 
ability to generate or retrieve positively- and negatively-toned specific 
ideas about the bad situation; second, the attributional analysis of 
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events in terms of internal, stable and global factors; third, the 
inability to generate any explanation for the situation (Brewin, 1992).  
Finally, in line with recent research indicating that positive affect and 
wellbeing are important variables in mental health (Fava, Rafanelli, 
Cazzaro, Conti, & Grandi, 1998; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) we 
examined positive affect separately from distress. 
   Most work on the stress-moderating effects of religion has looked at 
Christians and those from a Christian background, usually Protestant. In 
this study we sought to extend examination of effects of religion to 
include those from a different religious tradition, Judaism. There have 
been claims that psychiatric epidemiology may differ in Jewish compared to 
Christian populations (e.g. Levav, Kohn, Golding & Weissman, 1997; Sanua, 
1989), as may relevant social factors (Loewenthal, Goldblatt, Gorton, 
Lubitsh, Bicknell, Fellowes & Sowden, 1995, 1997a, 1997b). Some of these 
may be associated with differences in cognitive aspects of coping. 
 In view of the wide range of definition and measurement of 
religiosity, we chose to operationalize religiosity by assessing 
behaviours, attitudes and values common to the institutions of both the 
religious traditions studied: prayer, attendance at public worship, and 
religious study, together with three measures of orientation to religion, 
extrinsic, intrinsic and quest. Measures of orientation to religion were 
developed by Allport & Ross (1967) and Batson (1975) to account for the 
complex associations between religion and prejudice, and other aspects of 
personality, attitudes and wellbeing (Batson et al 1993). 
 This study therefore looked to see whether cognitive aspects of 
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coping were related to religiosity and to religious background, and 
whether these cognitive aspects of coping were related to wellbeing and 
distress.  There were three main hypotheses.  The first hypothesis was 
that religiosity would be associated with certain coping cognitions (an 
increased belief that all is for the best, that G-d is in control, and is 
providing support) and that such cognitions would in turn be associated 
with lowered distress.  Second, we predicted that the generation of 
positive - as opposed to negative - consequences of the stressful event, 
and providing external, unstable and specific attributions for its 
occurrence, and being able to provide any explanations at all, would be 
related to lowered distress.  Thirdly, we predicted that these consequence 
and attributional measures would also mediate the relationship between 
religiosity and distress. An exploratory aspect of the work was to examine 
the moderating role that positive affect might have on distress and how 
that role relates to religiosity and the cognition variables measured. No 
hypotheses could be advanced about whether cognition and outcome would 
differ by religious tradition (Protestant/Jewish).  As the hypotheses 
concern the causal inter-relationship of a number of variables a path 
diagram best illustrates them.  Figure 1 summarises the proposed 
hypothetical relationships between religion, cognition and outcomes. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 






 One hundred twenty six participants were targeted at the recruitment 
stage: sixty eight Protestants and fifty eight Jews. All were suffering 
high levels of stress as defined below. Three Protestant and three Jewish 
interviewers acted as centres of "snowballs". Recruiting was via the Royal 
Holloway subject panel, synagogue and church groups, and personal 
contacts. Interviewers were required to identify participants with the 
target characteristics for religious background (Protestant, Jewish), and 
likely high levels of stress. Only about one person in three was expected 
to be suffering sufficiently severe stress to qualify for inclusion (Brown 
& Harris, 1978), and interviewers were asked to use their knowledge of 
potential participants in selecting those to be approached. Participants 
were also targeted for age, gender, marital status and general religiosity 
as recruitment proceeded, so as to ensure comparability of Protestants and 
Jews on these features. Protestants were defined as those with current 
affiliation with a Protestant church (mostly United Reformed Church, 
Church of England, and Baptist), or in the case of the unaffiliated, both 
parents defined as Protestant. Jews were defined as those affiliated with 
an orthodox synagogue (United Synagogue, Union of Orthodox Hebrew 
Congregation, Sefardic or Federation, accounting for about 80% of 
affiliated Jews in the UK: Shmool & Cohen, 1990), or in the case of the 
unaffiliated, both parents defined as Jews.  All participants were 
English-speaking and living in Southern England at the time of the study.  
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 The mean age of all participants was 39.1 years, 49% were now-married 
and 62% were women. There were no differences between Protestants and Jews 
with respect to these variables.  We targeted a high proportion of 
participants who self-rated as low religious, and to check for possible 
unwanted confounded effects of religiosity we compared the religiously 
affiliated (n=69) with the unaffiliated (n=57). There were no significant 
differences in proportions of women and of the now-married. The affiliated 
were older than the unaffiliated (mean 43.4 years versus 35.4 years, 
t(121) = 2.54, p=.012), but when we ran our correlational analyses (Table 
2), partialling out age had no appreciable effects. 
Materials 
 Stress. This study included only those suffering from a level of 
stress that was potentially depressogenic, using Brown & Harris's (1978) 
criteria for a provoking agent for depression. To assess stress, we used 
the contextual criteria developed by Brown & Harris, as follows: in the 
recruitment phase, all participants completed a life events and 
difficulties screening checklist consisting of the Life Events and 
Difficulties Schedule (LEDS; Brown & Harris, 1978) categories, followed-up 
with specific questions from the LEDS to establish the presence of a 
provoking agent for depression. The presence of a (potentially 
depressogenic) provoking agent was defined as follows: at least one self 
or joint-focused event in the twelve months prior to interview, rated at 
least high-moderate on long-term contextual threat, and independent of any 
psychiatric illness; or at least one major difficulty, of at least high-
moderate threat, ongoing for at least two years prior to interview, and 
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still ongoing. Interviews and ratings were carried out by trained LEDS 
interviewers, in liaison with Tirril Harris and the Medical Research 
Council rating team in the Social Policy Department, Royal Holloway 
College, London University.  
 To check that the groups were comparable on types of stress, stress 
events and difficulties were classified as health-related, 
finance/employment-related, and relationships-related; the two groups were 
comparable on type of stress (Table 1). Thus any Protestant-Jewish 
differences could not be accounted by differing types of stress.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Religiosity (religious activity and orientation).  Participants self-
assessed on a range of five-point scales indicating frequency of prayer, 
attendance at place of worship, and religious study, and Batson's (1976) 
three scales of religious orientation, which deal with the importance and 
extent of different types of religious activity, such as taking advice 
from clergy (extrinsic), applying religious teachings in daily life 
(intrinsic) and examining religious doubts (quest). All six measures 
proved to be significantly inter-correlated, and after standardising each 
component measure, were used to form an overall religiosity measure with a 
satisfactory Cronbach's alpha (0.75). Note that the extrinsic, intrinsic 
and quest scales are not usually inter-correlated among samples of 
religiously-active participants (Batson et al, 1993). In this study, 
however, a high proportion of low-religious participants was deliberately 
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included. The high inter-correlation of the religious orientation scales 
indicates that they were functioning as a reflection of general 
religiosity, and they were used as such. 
 Cognitions.  (1) All for the best. Two 10 cm. visual analogue scales 
were used, on which the participant indicated the extent to which they 
thought the (most severe) event or difficulty was all for the best, and 
the extent to which they now think the stressor is all for the best. These 
ratings were combined to give an overall measure, for which alpha = 0.89. 
(2) G-d control and other causal attributions. Participants were asked to 
say why they thought the event or difficulty happened. The material was 
coded using Stratton, Heard, Hanks, Munton, Brewin & Davidson's (1986) 
causal attributional coding scheme, as follows: causal attributions in 
each statement were classified as internal vs. external, global vs. 
specific, stable vs. unstable, personal vs. universal, and uncontrollable 
vs. controllable, using Stratton et al's guidelines, with an additional 
category for causal attributions to G-d. Inter-rater agreement was 90% on 
a randomly-selected sample of 10% of the ratings, made independently by 
two members of the research team. As well as computing the number and 
proportion of G-d-control and other types of causal attribution, the 
presence/absence of internal + stable + global attributions was also 
computed for each subject. (3) Religious (Spiritual) Support Scale. This 
was originally termed the Spiritual Support scale(Maton, 1989). In spite 
of Maton’s original title for this scale, we were not concerned with 
assessing spirituality as a separate construct from religiosity 
(Zinnbauer, Pargament, Cole et al, 1997). Maton's three-item scale 
13        Comfort and Joy 
 
  
assesses the extent to which the person reports the use of religious 
constructs in coping, for example, "Religious faith has not been central 
to my coping", and was used as a measure of this (and not of 
spirituality).  For this sample, Cronbach's alpha was 0.79. (4) Proportion 
of positive consequences. This measure used procedures developed and 
reported by MacLeod et al (1993), and MacLeod & Byrne (1996). Participants 
were asked to state all outcomes perceived to have resulted from, or been 
forestalled by the stressful event or difficulty, and were given a time 
limit of one minute to generate as many outcomes as they could. This 
elicited specific good and bad consequences of events, rather than (as in 
1) examining global feelings that all is for the best. Participants were 
asked to describe both current and anticipated consequences of the 
stressor. These responses were later rated by the research team as "good", 
"bad" (or "neither" (7%); A 10% sample of ratings was rated independently 
by two members of the research team, and inter-rater agreement was 95%. 
The proportion of good outcomes was calculated. (5)  Intrusive unpleasant 
thoughts.  Participants were asked to rate their thoughts about the 
stressor on seven 5-point Likert-type scales: for i) frequency, ii) 
uncontrollability, iii) clarity and iv) unpleasantness of involuntary 
thoughts, and the v) frequency, vi) comfort and vii) helpfulness of 
deliberate thoughts about the  stressor. Item analysis indicated that the 
three items assessing uncontrollability, clarity and unpleasantness were 
significantly correlated (r ranged from 0.277 to 0.508, all significant at 
p<.001), and formed a cohesive scale (alpha=0.79). This three-item scale 
was used as a measure of intrusive, unpleasant thoughts. The other 
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thoughts ratings proved uncohesive and were not used further. 
 Of the cognitions measures, three will be referred to as religiously-
based cognitions: all for the best, G-d control (from the causal 
attributions measures), and religious/spiritual support. 
 Positive affect. the 10 positive-affect items from the PANAS 
(Positive and Negative Affect Scale; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) were 
used.  Among the sample tested, alpha was 0.88 for the positive affect 
scale. 
 Distress. The 10 negative-affect items from the PANAS (alpha=0.81 in 
this sample) were combined with the 7 depression and 7 anxiety items of 
the  DSSI/sAD (Delusions-States-Symptoms Inventory/states of Anxiety and 
Depression), which is a 14-item Likert-type scale with seven depression 
and seven anxiety items, validated against psychiatrists' ratings, and 
showing good criterion validity (Bedford, Foulds & Sheffield, 1976). In 
both the PANAS and the DSSI/sAD participants were asked to rate the extent 
to which they had recently experienced the state/mood in question.  The 
depression, anxiety and negative affect scores were significantly inter-
correlated (r ranged from 0.513 to 0.765, all significant at p<.001), and 
the overall combined distress measure had an alpha of 0.72. 
Procedure  
 Screening.  Potential participants were identified, approached 
individually by one of the researchers, and asked if they would 
participate in a study of stress and religion. They were asked to complete 
a questionnaire with demographic information, a 0-10 self-rating of 
religiosity, a LEDS checklist covering the previous 12 months, and a 
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written description of events and difficulties. Potential participants 
with moderate self-ratings on religiosity (4-6) were excluded from further 
study, to avoid the risk of overwhelming the study with large numbers of 
religious moderates who might obscure effects of religiosity and also to 
exclude those who were undecided. As recruitment proceeded we targeted 
participants with high or low self-ratings on religiosity as appropriate, 
to achieve comparability between Protestants and Jews. Sufficient 
questions from the Life Events and Difficulties Schedule were asked to 
establish whether or not a recent severe event or current major difficulty 
was likely, and those clearly without such major stress were excluded from 
further study. As recruitment proceeded further, we did not approach those 
who would unbalance the groups with regard to age, gender and marital 
status. None of those approached declined to participate. Of those who 
completed the screening questionnaire, two were excluded from further 
study since their level of stress was judged by the research team to be 
insufficiently high, and one further person was excluded since they did 
not meet the criteria for religious background.  
 Main phase.  Participants who met criteria from the screening phase 
and who were willing to take part in the full study were asked to complete 
all measures in the same testing session. If participants reported more 
than one stressor they were asked to focus on the most severe or 
difficult. Measures were completed in the following order by all 
participants: Religiosity (religious activity and orientation), distress 
and positive affect, intrusive unpleasant thoughts, and whether the 
stressor was seen as all for the best. Participants then wrote a short 
16        Comfort and Joy 
 
  
paragraph on why they thought the event/difficulty had happened (for 
causal attributional analysis), and then described all consequences of the 
stressor, both good, bad and neutral, both current and anticipated. 
Finally, participants were thanked for their participation, and were 
offered the opportunity for questions about the study, and to leave an 
address (to be stored independently of data to preserve anonymity) for 
results of the study. 
 
Results 
 Data reduction  
On the basis of preliminary some measures were eliminated or collapsed to 
clarify further analysis. First, there were no significant Protestant-
Jewish differences on the religiosity and cognition variables, and on the 
positive mood and distress measures. These non-significant effects of 
religious tradition have not been presented in more detail. Second, all 
except that G-d control measure of the causal attributional measures were 
eliminated: External, stable, specific attributions, and failing to offer 
explanations, were  unrelated both to religiosity and to the outcome 
measures. These attributional measures are not reported further in any 
detail. Third, the three Batson scales of religious orientation failed to 
show associations with other variables and have not been reported 
separately. The religious orientation scales were however standardised and 
combined with standardised scores from the religious activity measures. 
This yielded a more sensitive measure of overall religiosity than the 
initial self-rated religiosity. For the overall religiosity measure, 
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Cronbach’s alpha was 0.75. Finally, the overall distress measure was 
derived from the measures of negative affect, and of depression and 
anxiety, as described. 
Relationships between the main variables 
 Table 2 shows the Pearson correlations between eight measures: 
religosity (religious activity and orientation), three religious coping 
variables (all for the best, G-d control and religious support), the 
proportion of good consequences, and three outcome measures (positive 
mood, distress, and intrusive unpleasant thoughts.   
                   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Religiosity was associated with the three religious coping cognitions, 
albeit weakly with G-d control, as hypothesised, but these cognitions were 
not in turn associated with lowered distress. The generation of positive 
compared to negative consequences was associated with lowered distress, as 
hypothesised. However this was a weak association. The consequences 
measure was related to religiosity, as hypothesised, although weakly. 
Religiosity was associated with positive mood, as were two of the 
religious cognitions measures, and the consequences measure.  
Structural modelling of the predicted relationships 
The correlations in Table 2 were used to test the causal pathway model 
outlined in Figure 1. However as noted, only the G-d control variable was 
retained from the causal attributional measures since they did not related 
significantly to other variables. Using structural equation modelling 
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(AMOS), the initially-hypothesised model shown in Figure 1 produced 
unacceptably large goodness-of-fit statistics (X2=43.5, d.f.=12, p=.000, 
X2/d.f.>2; Normed Fit Index (NFI)= .772). Changes were made by deleting 
non-significant pathways, and by altering relationships between variables 
to make the best theoretical sense. The two main changes of this type were 
first, that intrusive unpleasant thoughts were best placed as antecedents 
rather than outcomes. A model in which they remained as outcomes, as 
originally hypothesised, had goodness-of-fit statistics similar to those 
of Figure 2. However without more data we could not justify it 
theoretically, since intrusive unpleasant thoughts related positively to 
the religious coping cognitions. The second main change was the deletion 
of the direct causal pathways between distress outcome and all of the 
coping cognitions variables. Figure 2 shows the best-fit model with 
regression weights. Goodness-of-fit statistics were satisfactory: X2 = 
22.74, d.f.=16, X2/d.f.= 1.42; Normed Fit Index (NFI)=0.881). 
 Causal pathway models based on the separate Protestant and Jewish 
data suggested no noteworthy differences from the model shown in Figure 2. 
 
                   INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion 
 How did the hypotheses and research questions fare? As hypothesised, 
religiosity was associated with the religiously-based cognitions, but 
these were not in turn directly associated with lowered distress. The only 
connection between these religious coping cognitions and lowered distress 
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was that they were associated with raised positive affect, which in turn 
was associated with lowered distress. If the religiously-based cognitions 
studied here are involved in the association between religiosity and lower 
distress, then it might be via this route. However the route is 
speculative since we cannot be confident about the direction of all the 
causal links, for instance that positive affect lowers distress.  
 There was only weak, partial support for the second hypothesis about 
consequences and attributions and their relations with distress. The 
perception of positive consequences did not relate directly to lowered 
distress. Like the religious cognitions, the perception of good 
consequences related to positive affect, and thus might have had an 
indirect distress-lowering effect. External, unstable and specific 
attributions did not relate to either positive affect or to distress (or 
to any other measures). Brewin (1988) has concluded that there is actually 
little or no evidence for the possibility that internal, stable, global 
attributions play a role in the onset of depression, as opposed to being a 
symptom or maintenance factor. It was largely the role of attributions in 
onset that was tested here and we discovered no evidence at variance with 
Brewin's conclusions. 
    Thirdly, we predicted that the consequence and attributional measures 
would also mediate the relationship between religiosity and distress. In 
fact neither the consequences nor the attributional measures related to 
religiosity. This prediction was speculative and although there has been 
some work suggesting links between religiosity and patterns of causal 
explanation, none map precisely onto the specific associations between 
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religiosity and distress hypothesised for this study. The consequences 
cognitions seemed to be involved in a separate route to coping, 
independent of religiosity.  
 An exploratory aspect of the work was to examine the moderating role 
that positive affect might have on distress. In fact the best-fitting 
causal pathway model differed from the hypothesised model chiefly in that 
the cognition variables had no direct relationship with distress, only 
with positive affect. 
 The two major differences between the initial causal pathway mode in 
Figure 1, and the best-fit model in Figure 2, were caused by the 
associations indicating that distress was not directly lowered by the 
religious coping cognitions, and that intrusive unpleasant thoughts should 
be considered outcomes rather than antecedents. This shift resulted from 
our view that without more data, we could not explain how religious coping 
cognitions could cause intrusive unpleasant thoughts. We could however 
argue that intrusive unpleasant thoughts might stimulate religious coping 
cognitions (McIntosh, 1995).  We had some expectation that religion and 
its beliefs might directly lower distress, and indeed unpleasant thoughts. 
However the data suggest a different set of causal pathways.  Rather than 
religious coping cognitions lowering intrusive unpleasant thoughts and 
distress, it looks as if intrusive unpleasant thoughts stimulate religious 
coping cognitions from any repertoire established by religious activities, 
as MacIntosh (1992) has suggested. To the extent that these cognitions are 
called into play, positive mood is evoked, and to the extent that positive 
mood is evoked, distress is lowered. Thus any effect of religious 
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cognitions in combating unpleasant thoughts was outweighed by a reverse 
effect: unpleasant thoughts appear to have stimulated religious coping 
beliefs - which were a source of positive affect, and indirectly lowered 
distress. Any lowering effect of religion on distress is thus indirect, 
via cognition and mood. 
 We have suggested in Figure 2 that positive mood may lower distress, 
though of course the reverse may be equally possible. Little is known 
about the direct effects of positive and negative mood states upon each 
other. Clark & Watson (1988) suggest that positive and negative mood are 
driven independently of each other by daily events: positive affect "ebbs 
and flows with the tide of events", while negative affect "crashes on us 
in times of trouble, only to disappear when the storm is over" (p.305). 
Several authors, however, have argued that mood and distress states are 
not directly driven by events but, rather, cognitive factors intervene. 
Further, Brown, Bifulco & Andrews (1990), MacLeod & Byrne (1996) and 
Needles & Abramson (1990) support the suggestion that a cognitively-driven 
improvement in mood may have a direct lowering effect upon distress. Our 
evidence suggests that this may be the case in this study. 
 Another noteworthy feature of the empirically-based model in Figure 2 
is the good consequences measure. This proved to be independent of the 
more global measure of seeing that ones troubles are all-for-the-best, and 
it related differently to other variables: it was independent of religion, 
and inversely related to intrusive unpleasant thoughts. The distinction 
between seeing specific consequences and general consequences is 
reminiscent of Williams' (1997) argument that specific and general 
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memories play different roles vis-à-vis emotion and the emotional 
disorders. Williams suggests that degree of trauma and distress is 
associated with fewer specific memories. In the present study, intrusive 
unpleasant thoughts, which were associated with distress, were associated 
with smaller proportions of positive specific consequences, such as 
memories of good outcomes and hopes for the future. Our data in relation 
to Williams' ideas suggest that the interplay between specific cognitions, 
distress and intrusive unpleasant thoughts deserves further attention. We 
have suggested particular causal directions of effects but do not wish to 
exclude other possibilities.  There was, however, one similarity between 
good consequences and the religious coping cognitions: both were 
associated with positive mood, and any distress-relieving effects appeared 
to operate indirectly, via improved mood. 
 Figure 2 is empirically-driven, but some of the suggested directional 
causal associations may not be warranted. We have made the best 
suggestions that we can in the light of the evidence and existing theory 
about what we think are the salient effects in the present study. The 
probability of bi-directional effects cannot be excluded. Thus those who 
are more cheerful may be better able to access comforting thoughts from a 
religiously-based repertoire, stress-related intrusive unpleasant thoughts 
may limit access to thoughts of specific positive consequences, and 
distress may lower positive mood - to indicate the most plausible 
alternative causal possibilities, which cannot be ruled out in a cross-
sectional study. However we have examined these possibilities by 
partialling out the effects of positive mood, intrusive unpleasant 
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thoughts and distress, and they had no appreciable effects.  
 To focus on one set of links - those surrounding perceived G-d 
control - we could consider more elaborate (alternative) interpretations. 
It has been suggested that people may be less likely to associate G-d with 
bad outcomes (Lupfer et al., 1992). This might be explained by putting 
together the self-serving bias (Zuckerman, 1979), the just world 
hypothesis (Lerner, 1980), and the suggestion of links between religion, 
guilt and self-esteem (Hood, 1992). The chain of reasoning might be: "If I 
feel bad now, I am not going to blame G-d, since this would mean I agree 
that G-d might be punishing me for being a bad person. Since I do not want 
to agree that I am bad, I am not going to say that G-d has anything to do 
with it". This kind of effect might account for some of the associations 
between religion, perceived G-d control and positive mood. It is also 
possible that some individuals may see G-d as a perceived cause for their 
sufferings, and instead of rejecting G-d as a cause, feel unworthy and 
unhappy as a result (Pargament & Brant, 1998). Our evidence does not offer 
much support for this having been a dominant effect, but it might have 
weakened the associations between religiosity, perceived G-d control and 
positive mood. Other effects at work might include the possibility that 
some individuals perceive a high degree of G-d control, coupled with a 
belief that all will work out ultimately for the best. This could account 
for the association between perceived G-d control and the overall all-for-
the-best measure. And finally we must consider the possibility that 
perceived G-d control is more likely for some types of events than others. 
This could account for the tenuousness of the relationship between 
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religiosity and G-d control.  
 Apart from the difficulties of interpreting direction and nature of 
causality, there are other limitations of the study. Better attention 
needs to be given to individual differences in religious and coping 
styles. Intrinsic religiosity has been highlighted in previous work as a 
strong candidate for a religiously-related stress-buffering factor. 
Extrinsic religiosity has been associated with poorer mental health 
(Batson et al., 1993). Pargament has identified three styles of religious 
coping: deferring, self-directing and collaborative (Pargament, Kennell, 
Hathaway, Grevengoed, Newman & Jones, 1988). For pragmatic reasons, we 
used a combined measure of religious activity but appreciate that a full 
account of religious coping must take fuller account of individual 
differences.  
 A related possibility is that, as suggested, there are negative 
effects of religiosity lurking among the data, masked by other effects. 
For example, Edmunds & Hooker (1992), and Wallston, Malcarne, Flores, 
Hansdottir, Smith, Stein, Weisman & Clements (in press) have recorded  
associations between religiosity and distress, for example that sometimes 
the use of prayer may be a desperate last resort, associated with 
catastrophizing and hopelessness. Religiously-based thoughts associated 
with distress might include “G-d is punishing me”, or “G-d does not care 
about me” (Pargament & Brant, 1998; Smith, 1999).  These observations 
differed from ours, and involved those suffering from specific types of 
stress. To clarify the different effects, more precise distinctions need 
to be made, for example in assessing perceptions of G-d control - as 
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Pargament et al. (1988), and Wallston et al. (1988) have done. 
 A possibly problematic feature of the methodology is thrown up by the 
causal pathway analysis. The move of intrusive unpleasant thoughts from 
the role of outcomes to antecedents was suggested because intrusive 
thoughts related positively to religious coping cognitions. Perhaps, as 
suggested, Intrusive unpleasant thoughts stimulated religious coping 
cognitions (McIntosh, 1995). But we did not have sufficiently precise 
measures to determine whether other causal pathways were possible. As 
discussed, we could not determine whether some religious thinking is 
associated with negative outcomes (Pargament & Brant, 1998; Smith, 1999) 
since we had no measures of cognitions such as “G-d does not care about 
me”. Such thinking is very likely associated with religiosity, and is 
likely involved in a spiral of deteriorating mood and brooding about the 
unhelpfulness of G-d. However we did not have measures to look at these 
relationships. 
 Another methodological limitation is that in the initial screening 
those scoring in the middle of the self-rated religiosity scale were for 
several reasons excluded from the study.  Although this scale was not used 
as the basis for any of the analyses reported, it may nevertheless have 
resulted in some biasing of the sample, which future research could 
rectify.  
 A final point for comment is the similarity between Protestants and 
Jews on the measures of religion, cognition and outcome. There are some 
suggestions of different prevalences of psychiatric disorders in the two 
groups, and some differences in the importance of different causal factors 
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(Loewenthal et al., 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Levav, Kohn, Golding & Weissman, 
1997). This study however produced no noteworthy evidence of Protestant-
Jewish differences in distress, and (perhaps paralleling this) there were 
no noteworthy Protestant-Jewish differences in the cognitions studied 
here. Our research design enabled us to ensure that levels and types of 
stress were similar in the two groups of participants. We feel confident 
that there were genuine commonalities between the two religious traditions 
in the cognitive aspects of coping. 
 There are features of this study which deserve emphasis. First, 
although the design involved cross-sectional measurement, we have  
incorporated features of the important methodologies developed by Brown & 
Harris (e.g. 1978, 1989), which ensured that reported life-events and 
difficulties were prior to current mood and symptoms, and thus could be 
causal or maintenance factors. Contextual stress measurement was also 
used. These features have been argued to overcome some of the traditional 
difficulties of cross-sectional and retrospective studies. Therefore 
although we wish to be cautious about the directions of causality 
suggested, we also wish to emphasise that our research design lends some 
support in terms of temporal ordering: stress was determined to be prior 
to the outcome measures (positive mood and distress), and the coping-
related cognitions were explicitly related to coping with the prior event 
or stressor. The main shortcoming in the design was the failure to assess 
religiosity prior to the stressor. This weakens our direction of causality 
suggestions as far as religiosity is concerned, since the measurement of 
religiosity does not allow us to position it temporally in relation to the 
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other variables. Also we could not look at religious change in relation to 
outcome.  
 Other important features of the study include the separation of 
positive mood and negative mood (distress) measurement, in line with 
growing body of suggestions that these features of emotion need to be 
considered independently. A final feature of the study was the range of 
measures of religion-related features of coping. There are directions in 
which these could be made more precise, and this will in turn improve 
understanding of ways in which aspects of religion may be related to worse 
and better outcomes in individuals under stress.  
 In conclusion, this study offers suggestions about some roles played 
by religion in mediating between stress and distress, as well as mediating 
pathways that were independent of religion.  The study offers suggestions 
regarding which religious beliefs and ideas might be effective in stress-
moderating, and how these beliefs and ideas might achieve their effects. 
In particular, the interplay of cognition and emotion in comfort deserves 
further study.  
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Table 2: Inter-correlations between religion, cognition and mood measures. 













Religiosity   -        
All for the
Best 
.29**   -       




.80*** .15 .18   -     
Proportion 
Of good  
consequence
.17 .17 .00 .16   -    
Positive mo .37*** .29* .21* .27** .22*   -   




.22* -.04 .26* .27** -.24* -.02 .40**   - 
           
Notes 1): *  p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (all two-tailed probabilities).  
2) Further, partial correlations were computed, partialling out the effects of 
i) positive mood ii) intrusive thoughts and iii) distress. The coefficients 
were of the same order as those shown above and are therefore not included. 
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Figure 1.  Hypothetical relationships between religion, cognitions, and 
outcomes in individuals under stress. 
Figure 2. Relationships between religion, cognitions, and individuals under 
stress (with regression weights and significance levels). 
